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I love movie theaters.  I realize this is a rather odd and 
casual way to begin what will inevitably be viewed as my 
defining work as a graduate student.  However, I would argue 
that this simple four-word preface is a fitting introduction to 
my methodology behind this project.  For me, going to the movies 
is more about the experience itself rather than a pure interest 
in the feature presentation.  I have always admired and been 
completely fascinated with the architecture and overall style of 
every theater I’ve visited.  From the eclipsed single screen and 
twin complexes to the modern behemoths that delight audiences 
with a veritable maze of entertainment choices, each location 
maintains its own method of showmanship which in turn fosters a 
constant flow of customers each week.  But, what is it that is 
so seductive about an evening at the cinema?  Certainly most of 
the credit can be allotted to the latest Hollywood feature, and 
the filmmakers that drive said vehicle.  However, I would argue 
that the theater complex itself is also a factor for each film’s 
success or failure.  Whether they realize it or not, most 
moviegoers weigh certain criteria, such as location, atmosphere, 
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admission cost, and customer service, before choosing which 
theater will win their business. 
 While many of my colleagues in the film studies program 
choose to critique and analyze the feature itself, I tend to 
examine the parts that make such a presentation possible.  Since 
I maintain an unusually high appreciation for movie theaters, it 
seems natural that I would adopt exhibition studies as my key 
academic methodology.  Within this realm, I can try to provide 
concrete evidence which suggests how audiences received their 
entertainment, where they enjoyed each weekly feature, why they 
returned to the cinema, what promotions attracted them, and who 
was responsible for putting it all together.  While providing 
answers to these and other queries is no doubt beneficial to 
film studies as a whole, finding the research to help guide this 
process can be difficult.  In order to deliver the best work, 
the scholar must be willing to devote their time and attention 
to various forms of archival materials, such as newspaper 
articles, legal records, personal correspondence, and other 
primary sources.  However, as a student of history and a fanatic 
of the cinema, this extensive process is more a labor of love 
than a tedious experience.                
 While I consider myself to be an odd exception, this 
sometimes overwhelming approach to film might explain why 
exhibition studies is still in its infancy.  Of course, I am 
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indebted to the work of scholars, like Douglas Gomery, Kathryn 
Fuller-Seeley, Robert Sklar, and Gregory Waller, who have 
provided an academic blueprint to emulate and follow.  Like 
myself, these authors choose to write articles and books about 
the history of film exhibition in America, and their research 
has been a vital part of my own pursuits.  As I complete my work 
on this and all future projects, I hope to add just a bit more 
to the conversation that they and others have started.   
 The topic for this thesis was actually born from a book 
report I produced a couple years ago.  The assignment was part 
of a film class which covered the earlier years of the motion 
picture industry.  Naturally, I decided to look for something 
related to exhibition during this period and was lucky to find a 
primary text entitled The Management of Motion Picture Theaters 
by Frank Ricketson.  This book, which was published in 1938, was 
essentially a manual for theater operators and discussed 
everything from a treatise on how ushers should maintain proper 
decorum to a comfortable setting for the air conditioning 
system.  In a sense, Ricketson’s manual presented a unique and 
personal glimpse into the daily life of a theater operator.  As 
much as I enjoyed the text, there was one glaring omission that 
attracted my interest.  In a section called “Constructive 
Stimlation,” the author outlines how managers can attract more 
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customers through various promotional tactics and giveaways.  In 
his introduction, Ricketson argues: 
[Bank Night] was an innovation which helped lift the 
[motion picture] industry from the depression.  [It] added 
literally hundreds of thousands of new theater patrons, and 
many showhouses which as a policy did not feature a 
giveaway opened their doors to it. (250) 
 Since the work was originally published in 1938, the author 
probably assumed that managers knew about Bank Night and did not 
feel it was necessary to elaborate beyond this statement.  This 
aforementioned quote is the extent of his discussion on the 
topic.  For modern readers like myself, however, this rather 
vague statement is not enough to provide any satisfaction.  What 
was Bank Night?  How exactly did it save the movie industry 
during such a horrific period in American history?  Why did 
thousands of people participate in the promotion?  Where did 
Bank Night originate, and who is responsible for its creation?  
Although Frank Ricketson, who I later discovered to be one of 
the key figures behind Bank Night, failed to provide these 
answers, I relied on information from Gomery, Fuller-Seeley, 
Sklar, Waller, and others.  However, even their descriptions 
provided few clues regarding the promotion’s true impact on 
American society during the 1930s. 
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 With the help of certain scholarly texts, hundreds of 
newspaper articles, various court documents, excerpts from trade 
magazines, government records, and other primary sources, I have 
constructed an in-depth look at Bank Night from its creation to 
the successes and controversies that followed.  It is a 
fascinating look at film exhibition, and how theater managers 
struggled to keep their doors open during one of the most 









Before the infamous stock market crash of October 1929, and 
before its disastrous effects spread all across the country, the 
motion picture industry thrived as America’s biggest producer of 
popular entertainment.  In the four years leading up to the 
catalyst for the Great Depression, weekly box-office reports 
continually reflected the public’s growing fascination with the 
relatively new medium (Shindler 4).  By 1925, nearly fifty-five 
million people attended their local neighborhood cinema or 
downtown palace each week.  In 1929, two years after the 
introduction of “talking” pictures, 110 million Americans 
succumbed to the weekly movie-going habit (Fuller-Seeley, “Dish” 
248).  In fact, even as the economy faltered, many people 
escaped the real-world destruction, if only for two-hours, 
within one of the 23,000 movie theaters open for business 
(Reynolds 211).  The film industry touted that its immunity to 
the devastating financial crisis was, in part, thanks to the 
addition of sound (210).  In his first-hand chronicle of the 
period, historian Dixon Wecter confirms, “the initial thrill of 
the ‘all-talking, all-singing’ picture, particularly the delight 
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of hearing voices of stars long adored in silent films, helped 
tide the industry over depression’s first shallows…” (236). 
 Although the inclusion of sound in motion pictures provided 
temporary relief to the theater owners who were wealthy enough 
to equip their houses with the new technology, it doomed those 
locations that failed to make the transition (Butsch 110).  In 
order to stay in business, thousands of theaters, many in small 
towns, reduced their presentations to once or twice a week 
(Fuller-Seeley, “Dish” 247).  This meant that patrons with the 
movie-going habit needed to find an alternate location in order 
to obtain their weekly escape.  Working class audiences, who 
once relied on their humble neighborhood cinema to provide their 
evening’s entertainment, traveled to the nearest city where they 
enjoyed the latest Hollywood feature in a manner to which the 
middle-class patrons were already accustomed (Butsch 111).  
Small-town moviegoers gladly exchanged their overcrowded, dimly-
lit theater for the extravagant and glowing complexes a few 
blocks away.  These larger, more attractive movie houses 
presented more than just a movie.  Ushers and other staff 
members provided personal service to each customer from the 
sidewalk to the auditorium.  Large orchestras entertained 
audiences before, during, and after the program with familiar 
classical scores and Broadway medleys.  Elaborate decorations 
and light fixtures blanketed the entire building, and properly 
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maintained air conditioning systems insured a comfortable 
experience for everyone (Gomery 47-54; Fuller 99).  Once small-
town audiences witnessed the grandeur of the downtown movie 
palace, it was difficult to return to the less-than-glamorous 
theater in their respective rural town.   
 By the summer of 1930, the grim realities of the Great 
Depression started to cut through the mental safety net provided 
by the movie theater.  Millions of Americans lost their jobs as 
the unemployment rate skyrocketed to over twenty-five percent.  
Even those who held part-time positions saw their ranks reduced 
by another quarter (Fuller-Seeley, “Dish” 246).  Thousands of 
farmers struggled to maintain their crops through an unforgiving 
drought and inevitably lost the battle when agricultural prices 
hit bottom (Fuller-Seeley, “What The Picture” 188).  And, the 
downtown bank that once provided financial shelter to cash-
strapped individuals could no longer remain solvent (Borowsky 
359).  For those families lucky enough to maintain even a meager 
savings, it was painfully clear that major financial adjustments 
were necessary if they were to survive the turbulent times. 
 As Americans judged the importance of each expense, 
entertainment seemed the logical item to exclude from the family 
budget.  Attendance at baseball games and other sporting events 
dropped forty percent, and minor league organizations were all 
but wiped out as a result (Fuller-Seeley, “Dish” 246).  The 
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incredibly popular miniature golf courses that were once a 100 
million dollar business closed up and “[left] the face of the 
nation pitted with greens made of dyed cottonseed” (Wecter 220).  
Even the “Great White Way” of New York City felt the strain as 
two-thirds of its theaters shut down (Fuller-Seeley, “Dish” 
246).  Instead of a night out, families stayed in the home and 
relied on each other for entertainment.  They passed the time 
with card and board games, and programs on the radio provided 
hours of enjoyment at no additional cost (Wecter 219; Gomery 
70).   
The soap operas, dramas, and detective stories thrilled 
audiences each night and presented the biggest threat to the 
motion picture industry, which was by now no stranger to the 
entertainment crunch of the time.  As Americans distanced 
themselves from their weekly movie-going habit, theater owners 
worried that the lack of business meant the end for their once 
profitable venues.  In fact, the sudden slump was an unwelcomed 
additional burden for independently-owned houses who were 
already threatened by the vertically-integrated movie studios 
and their quest to dominate the industry.  By the early 1930s, 
the five major Hollywood firms (Paramount, Warner Brothers, Fox, 
RKO, and Loews) owned 2,600 of the 23,000 theaters open at the 
time.  While this number might not seem impressive, the studio-
owned theaters represented three-quarters of the total box-
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office revenue each year (Shindler 4).  The vast remainder of 
American cinemas were owned by families or private businesses 
and were generally located in working-class neighborhoods, 
smaller towns, and rural areas (Butsch 108).  Many of these 
independent movie theaters, struggling with both the financial 
crisis and competition from the major studios, simply could not 
survive.  By 1932, an estimated 8,000 cinemas closed for 
business, the majority of which were independents (Fuller-
Seeley, “Picture” 188; Balio 15). 
For those movie theaters that survived this first wave of 
ruin, it was clear that drastic changes were necessary in order 
to bring audiences back to their auditoriums.  Instead of 
touting the luxurious atmosphere of their grand downtown movie 
palaces, owners changed their venues to accommodate every 
customer regardless of their income level (Butsch 110).  All the 
major studio-owned theaters cut admission prices to as low as a 
dime in some locations.  Fox Theaters even offered two-for-one 
deals on certain evenings to help boost their falling box-office 
receipts (Shindler 27).  Cinemas opened their first concession 
stands and sold popcorn, candies, and soda in order to raise 
additional money.  And, as a further cost cutting measure, 
theater owners fired their ushers and turned on the auditorium 
lights in-between each presentation, which allowed the patrons 
themselves to find their own seats (Butsch 111). 
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These changes temporarily helped ward off any financial 
disaster.  However, for independent theaters, they provided 
further misery.  Since the bigger cinemas reduced their 
admission to a rate comparable with small-town venues, owners 
and managers sought to employ a different incentive if they 
wanted to stay afloat (Balio 27).  Theaters began offering a 
chance to win special prizes and goods with each paid admission.  
Audience members had an opportunity to take home everything from 
bicycles to vacuum cleaners and even larger prizes like cars and 
vacations (Shindler 27; Doherty 30-31).   
Aside from these one-winner sweepstakes, managers handed 
out smaller items to each and every customer as they entered the 
door.  This promotional idea was nothing new.  In fact, 
nickelodeons gave away all sorts of gifts to their patrons, like 
pictures of their favorite movie stars, handkerchiefs, booklets, 
and stuffed animals.  These goods rarely cost more than one or 
two cents each, and owners could easily recoup their expense 
through ticket sales (Fuller-Seeley, “Dish” 254).  For a similar 
event to work during the Great Depression, the price for every 
special prize would need to be just as inexpensive.  Managers 
and owners could not afford to spend more than what they could 
bring in on a slow weeknight.  Luckily, their solution was not 
only cheap to produce and purchase, but it helped bring a new 
group of moviegoers to the cinema each week. 
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On either Mondays, which tended to be the slowest business 
day of the week, or Fridays, in order to compete with the new 
films opening at the larger houses, many of the smaller 
neighborhood theaters gave out special pieces of china with 
every paid admission.  Each plate or cup only cost the theater 
owner a dime, and they usually purchased a thousand pieces (at a 
total cost of one hundred dollars) to prepare for every 
promotion (Gomery 71).  As I mentioned earlier, owners could 
hardly afford such a steep expense.  However, if the giveaway 
worked, they could easily bring in three times that amount at 
the box-office as patrons exchanged their twenty-cent ticket for 
a ten-cent novelty (71).  The managers called their special 
promotion “Dish Night,” and they waited to see how the public 
would respond. 
The giveaways were a grand success.  Audiences visited 
their local theater each week in order to obtain the special 
plate or cup available that evening.  They returned for as long 
the promotion continued and helped increase box-office during 
the normally slow weekday presentations (Butsch 112).  The women 
who attended “Dish Night” were simply determined to collect an 
entire set of china even if it was only one small piece at a 
time (112).  Female patrons even travelled from theater to 
theater in order to determine which location had the better 
merchandise that particular evening (Kusell 190).  In her 
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article on this phenomenon, Kathryn Fuller-Seeley comments on 
the importance of “Dish Night” during the Great Depression: 
With pretty dishes on the table, a woman could have at 
least a few new consumer items in the house.  Further, she 
got to know them well as she washed them up every night.  
Plates, cups and bowls were useful items, but they could 
also be beautiful objects, desirable enough to collect.  
For a poor woman, a matched set of new dishes could 
symbolize a return of the family’s former prosperity, or a 
step up the ladder toward gentility. (“Dish” 254) 
Although many independent theaters included “Dish Night” as 
part of their weekly schedule, the larger, studio-owned theaters 
declined to extend such a promotion to their own customers.  
They felt that such a cheap gimmick would work for a few weeks 
or even months but then fade away after customers finished their 
collections (Kusell 190).  Also, they and their corporate owners 
disliked the very notion of giveaways as it detracted from the 
quality of their on-screen product.  If audiences attended the 
theater in order to obtain some trinket instead of a desire to 
see the featured movie, it somehow cheapened the entire filmic 
experience.  Hollywood producers, along with some of the major 
motion picture journals of the period, such as Motion Picture 
News and Exhibitors Herald, believed that theater owners and 
managers needed to concentrate on the showmanship that once made 
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the industry great (Fuller-Seeley, “Dish” 256).  They were 
disgusted that money which should be spent on film rentals and 
other operational expenses was directed toward ten-cent dishes 
and other random goods (Butsch 112).  
Regardless of the negative feedback from their competitors, 
independent theaters continued with “Dish Night” and other 
different promotions for as long as they could.  When the 
giveaways no longer worked, owners reduced ticket cost on 
certain evenings and even admitted entire families for one 
special low price (Butsch 112).  If that failed to bring people 
in, they hosted trivia contests and beauty pageants in order to 
attract patrons to their cinema (112).  Independents even worked 
with local businesses and community organizations, such as 4H 
clubs, to support their cause and show a positive connection 
with their respective towns (112).  Despite all of these 
efforts, however, independents eventually felt the sting of the 
Great Depression as box-office receipts continued to decline. 
By the end of 1932, as Americans adjusted their 
entertainment budgets further, movie attendance dropped as much 
as thirty-five percent, which lead to the closure of hundreds 
more theaters across the country (Doherty 28).  The once-popular 
giveaways were no longer enough to encourage moviegoers to 
continue their weekly habit.  As Kathryn Fuller-Seeley argues, 
“the winter of 1932-33 was just about the toughest year in the 
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history of the amusement business” (“Dish” 248).  Even Sam Katz, 
famed showman and then Paramount executive, admitted to a group 
of theater managers that the industry’s future was uncertain: 
Nothing would give me greater pleasure at this time than to 
be able to forecast an immediate return to prosperity.  In 
all honesty, I cannot do it.  There is no use kidding 
ourselves.  We are not half-grown boys, but mature, 
seasoned men and we should look things square in the face.  
As I see it, we have not as yet come to the turn in the 
road.  There is still a hard pull ahead of us. (Doherty 29)    
 While temporary admission price reductions and inexpensive 
gifts helped theater owners through a difficult financial 
period, these schemes were still not enough to keep audiences in 
the movie-going habit.  By the beginning of 1933, estimated 
weekly attendance figures dropped to 50 million people, a 
decline of nearly fifty percent from previous years (Fuller-
Seeley, “Dish” 248).  The five major movie studios stopped 
construction on their elaborate downtown movie palaces in favor 
of smaller venues in close proximity to the already established 
independent theaters (Butsch 111).  As it stood, the Hollywood 
giants did not view these privately-owned houses with any high 
regard.  In fact, to the major studios who tried to control all 
aspects of the movie business from production to exhibition, the 
independents were “at the bottom of the [entertainment] 
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hierarchy” and presented the only real hurdle to their 
domination of the industry itself (114).  The disastrous 
economic effects of the Great Depression helped wipe out a third 
of America’s smaller theaters, while the others barely held on 
thanks to their short-lived promotions (108).  If the 
independents were to survive, they needed anything short of a 








Like many theater owners and managers across America, 
Charles Yaeger, a district supervisor for Fox Intermountain 
Theaters, constantly tried to develop new promotions and 
gimmicks in order to bring audiences back to his houses in 
Colorado and New Mexico.  He reduced ticket prices, gave away 
groceries and other goods, hosted beauty pageants, and teamed up 
with community organizations in the hope that these events would 
help stimulate his dying box-office revenue (Borowsky 365).  “I 
considered every giveaway I’d ever promoted,” Yaeger stated in 
an interview with the Saturday Evening Post.  “They all seemed 
lousy, and I dreaded to put the bee on local merchants any 
longer for merchandise.  I knew I was getting in their hair” 
(Parkhill 21).  While his boss, Frank Ricketson, expressed 
severe displeasure with the performance of his theaters, he 
desperately tried to develop something new to not only save the 
cinemas, but his job as well (21). 
Yaeger was no stranger to the stress of the motion picture 
industry.  His parents owned a small theater in Del Norte, 
Colorado called The Princess.  His father served as general 
manager, while his mother worked as the cashier.  Young Charles 
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helped out his parents as the theater’s usher and, on certain 
occasions, ran the movie projector (Parkhill 20).  In 1926, he 
traded his life in the film industry to one on the open road as 
a truck driver for the D & R company, owned by Dick Dickson and 
Frank Ricketson (21).  Besides trucking, the duo also maintained 
thirty movie theaters in the Southwest, mainly in Colorado and 
New Mexico.  In 1929, just before the October stock market 
crash, Dickson & Ricketson sold their houses to Fox, and they 
became part of the new Fox Intermountain chain (21).   
While Dickson bowed out completely, Ricketson stayed on 
with the circuit as its general manager and was essentially 
still in charge of all the day-to-day business (Parkill 21; 
Borowsky 362).  Since the company was in its infancy, there was 
a need to hire experienced staff to handle the many different 
tasks in order to run a successful theater chain.  By this time, 
Ricketson was already familiar with Charles Yaeger as an 
employee of his trucking company.  After learning of his 
family’s theater business and experience in the film industry, 
the manager asked Yaeger to work with Fox Intermountain as a 
booker (Parkhill 21).  After only a few short months, Ricketson 
was so impressed with his new employee’s performance that he was 
promoted to district supervisor, a position responsible for all 
theaters in southern and western Colorado and New Mexico 
(Borowsky 365).   
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Before the disastrous winter of 1932, box-office receipts 
held steady at Yaeger’s locations.  In order to maintain a 
revenue stream, he followed the trends of other independent 
theater owners across America by implementing special prize 
raffles and other incentives.  Also in line with some of the 
industry changes, Yaeger reduced the admission prices at his 
houses and even created something called “Prosperity Day,” in 
which customers could purchase special discounted tickets in 
advance for a future weekday matinee (Borowsky 365).  While 
these ideas worked temporarily, Yaeger knew that the public 
would not be pleased once admission prices returned to their 
normal rate.  Plus, all of his promotions failed to promote any 
repeat business from customers.  
By early 1933, Ricketson pleaded with Yaeger to develop 
some gimmick to save their dying enterprise.  The young 
executive tried desperately to construct an event like no other 
before it.  In a later interview with the Rocky Mountain Sun, 
Yaeger recalled the stressful situation and his moment of 
inspiration: 
We’d given away everything under the sun.  I used to wake 
up nights trying to think of a new angle, something that 
would keep people coming to the theater week after week.  
One day—I remember I was shaving at the time—it hit me, 
just like that.  Cold hard cash.  That’s what people want.  
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And not just five dollars either, but something big enough 
for them to want it.  (Borowsky 366) 
For Yaeger, money was that one element that would help his 
promotional formula succeed.  Instead of inexpensive plates or 
holiday hams, the cash-strapped families of the depression era 
could use these winnings to provide whatever was needed. 
 Of course, since his theaters were already on the brink of 
bankruptcy, Yaeger needed to insure that his new idea would not 
contribute to further financial losses for the company.  He 
planned to test launch his cash giveaway at only one location 
under his direct supervision, the Egyptian Theater in Delta, 
Colorado.  And, if it didn’t work out, Yaeger would simply write 
off the expense as advertising cost (Parkhill 21).  Since the 
Egyptian was a 725-seat house, he calculated the first cash 
prize should be equal to the cost of one-sixth of the 
auditorium, which was thirty dollars.  That way, in order to 
break even for the night, the Egyptian only needed to fill those 
120 seats.  Also, in order for his special promotion to capture 
the community’s attention, Yaeger planned to run the event once 
a week for eleven weeks with a special grand prize of seventy-
five dollars at its conclusion (Borowsky 366).  As with every 
other promotion that seemed to die off after a few weeks, Yaeger 
felt that this new gimmick would help attract audiences if only 
for two to three months (Parkhill 21).   
Stuckey 21 
	  
 After developing his grand idea, the young supervisor 
wasted little time promoting it to the public through 
advertisements in the local newspaper, flyers in various 
businesses, and other outlets (Borowsky 366).  Yaeger called his 
creation “Gold Night” and claimed that it would be “an antidote 
to economic despair” (359).  The Delta County Independent 
reported the event to its readers with the headline, “Egyptian 
Plans Big Prosperity Event For The City,” which was immediately 
trumped by the article’s first line:  “Yellow gold is going to 
outshine any trace of depression” (359).  While the community 
feverishly anticipated the grand event, Yaeger still remained 
skeptical of its success.  He continued to develop the fine 
details for his promotion, which was to be introduced to the 
public on March 2, 1933 (366). 
 As B. R. Crisler comments in his article about Bank Night 
for The New York Times, the “game” was relatively ingenious in 
its simplicity.  “It is better business,” he writes, “to give 
away cash to a selected few of the paying customers on an ‘off’ 
night in order to fill the house with people…than it is to play 
to empty seats” (Crisler 5).  While this was the preferred 
scenario, Yaeger’s rules for “Gold Night” did not require any 
patron to purchase a ticket at all (Parkhill 21).  The reason 
for this was two-fold.  First, the idea of a free cash prize 
would be a universally appealing promotion since many Americans 
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were no doubt short on money at the time.  Second, since 
customers did not pay for an entry into the weekly sweepstakes, 
Yaeger believed “Gold Night” would avoid any charges under 
Colorado lottery laws which prohibited paid chances for jackpots 
(“Cinema: Bank Night”). 
 In order to win, patrons needed to visit the theater prior 
to the night of the drawing.  The manager placed a special 
registration book in the lobby, and those persons who wished to 
participate in the “Gold Night” drawing submitted their name and 
address for consideration.  Those names were then paired up with 
a number that corresponded with each signature line in the 
register.  After completing this simple task, registered 
customers returned to the theater for the official drawing, 
which was purposefully held on the slowest business day of the 
week in order to attract more attention to the theater (Parkhill 
82).  Like the registration, no purchase of any kind was 
required to be present for the drawing.  If the public did not 
want to be in the auditorium, they could easily hear the winning 
announcement over a loud speaker system either in the theater 
lobby or outside sidewalk (Borowsky 358).   
 Then, in the minutes before the main feature began, the 
management prepared everyone for the wildly anticipated moment.  
Employees pushed a large, steel drum on the stage which held 
hundreds of tickets with number combinations similar to those in 
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the registration book.  When the fanfare subsided, the manager 
picked a child from the audience, placed a blindfold over their 
eyes, and asked them to pull out the winning ticket from the 
container (Borowsky 357).  The selected number was then matched 
up with its mate from the register, and the lucky winner’s name 
was announced both in the theater and over the loud speakers.  
The chosen individual then had only a few minutes to appear on-
stage and claim their cash prize (Parkhill 82).  Once a winner 
appeared, the manager verified that his or her signature matched 
the one from the registration book and asked for confirmation of 
their identity from members of the audience.  When these 
conditions were met, the winner was awarded their money (Kusell 
190).  However, if the selected person failed to emerge from the 
crowd, a portion of the cash prize was included as part of the 
next week’s promotion (Parkhill 82).  As Forbes Parkhill 
comments in his article for the Saturday Evening Post, “the 
impelling factor that [brought patrons] back…each week…[was] 
that horrible fear of being absent if [their] name [was] drawn” 
(82).                                                      
 During the last week of February 1933, Yaeger requested 
that his special “Gold Night” registration book be placed in the 
lobby of the Egyptian Theater.  Despite all the press attention, 
he remained hesitant that this idea would bring patrons back to 
his theater.  At the most, Yaeger anticipated that “Gold Night” 
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would complete its eleven-week run and die off in the same 
manner as the other promotions he had tried (Borowsky 366).  The 
Egyptian scheduled the first drawing on Thursday, March 2, 1933 
before a screening of George Archainbaud’s The Penguin Pool 
Murder, the first feature based on the Hildegard Withers 
mysteries (Borowsky 366).  Although he created the special 
promotion, Yaeger was not able to attend that evening.  Since 
his duties as district supervisor applied to other locations, he 
was in New Mexico overseeing operations at another theater 
(366).  One might assume that his convenient departure may have 
also been a sign that Yaeger did not want to be there if his big 
night fell flat.  Thankfully for him and for the independent 
theaters that would soon adopt the practice, it was exactly the 
opposite.  
 On the evening of March 2, Yaeger telephoned Egyptian 
Theater manager Harry Brown to inquire about the night’s 
business.  He prepared himself for disastrous news, but Brown’s 
voice cracked with both elation and frustration.  “The house is 
spilling over,” Brown exclaimed.  “We’ve grossed more tonight 
that we did all of last week.  They’re lining up at the door” 
(Borowsky 366).  Needless to say, Yaeger was delighted to hear 
that his promotion had succeeded where others missed the mark.  
The lure of cash attracted more patrons back to the theater than 
the promise of a discounted plate or turkey dinner.  He was 
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confident that his “Gold Night” event would grow stronger each 
week and planned to extend it beyond its planned eleven-week 
life cycle.  Also, based on its success at the Egyptian, Yaeger 
prepared to try it out at all of the theaters under his direct 
supervision.  Chances are, if it worked for one, it would work 
for all.   
 Despite the reports of its success in every location it was 
held, Yaeger was never able to be at the theater to see the 
crowds first hand.  That is, until the summer of 1933, when he 
made the trek to visit the West Theater in Trinidad, Colorado, a 
small community devastated by the Great Depression (Parkhill 
21).  On the night of the drawing, the horrific weather 
conditions nearly kept Yaeger away.  However, as he approached 
the theater, he noticed a doubled line of people which stretched 
down the length of the street.  They stood in the pouring rain 
and waited until the night’s winner was announced (Borowsky 
367).  After he witnessed the incredible effect that his 
promotion had on the community, Yaeger began to imagine the 
future possibilities for his new enterprise.  “If [Gold] Night 
can sky-high receipts in one region,” he pondered, “why can’t it 
do the same elsewhere?  What would theaters everywhere be 
willing to pay for such a grand business builder?” (Parkhill 
21).  With this thought in mind, Yaeger traveled to Fox 
Intermountain’s home office in Denver to meet with Frank 
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Ricketson and discuss a plan to introduce the Great Depression 
antidote to a nationwide audience (21).   
 Before they developed their full-blown business plan, 
Ricketson advised his colleague about trademark laws and the 
possibility of infringement on his intellectual property.  The 
two completed and filed paperwork that protected both the name 
of the promotion and the event itself.  During this stage, they 
also agreed to change “Gold Night” to the more appealing “Bank 
Night” since, according to its creator, “the prize money was to 
be deposited in the bank” (Parkhill 21).  Aside from its new 
name, Ricketson and Yaeger developed a list of fourteen other 
alternate titles and planned to trademark them all in order to 
keep theaters from using their promotion without permission.  
They then filed the official paperwork with every state office 
that permitted this type of registration by name (21).  Also, on 
November 16, 1933, the executives created a business outside of 
Fox Intermountain called Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., which was 
to be the home office for all Bank Night related business 
(Affiliated v. Commissioner 1940 390).  Five days afterward, 
Yaeger dispatched an application to the United States Patent 
Office for his promotion and labeled it as a “Means for 
Conducting Prize Drawings” (Affiliated v. Commissioner 1940 
393).   
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Although the government denied his request, Yaeger remained 
confident that Bank Night would be a great success for the new 
Affiliated Enterprises.  On December 3, 1933, he resigned his 
position with Fox Intermountain in order to make Bank Night and 
its distribution his full-time priority (Parkhill 21).  
Ricketson remained with the theater circuit but partnered with 
Yaeger as Affiliated’s chief financial supporter.  It was a 
risky move for both men.  If Yaeger failed, his chances of 
finding another job during a period of widespread unemployment 
would be slim.  Furthermore,   Ricketson’s initial cash 
investment would be reduced to nothing, and it would be 
extremely difficult for him to rebuild any lost capital.  Bank 






Growing A Business 
 
 In early January 1934, Charles Yaeger rented a small office 
space in Denver, which was to be the home base for Affiliated 
Enterprises, Inc. (Parkhill 21).  He hired three people to help 
with the day-to-day clerical responsibilities and asked his 
wife, Clover, to work as the company’s assistant manager 
(Affiliated v. Commissioner 1940 391).  The group distributed 
information about Bank Night to theaters across America, and 
Yaeger patiently awaited any response from parties interested in 
purchasing the rights to his unique program.  In order to keep 
his new company afloat, he projected that at least one hundred 
theaters needed to sign up for Bank Night before the year’s 
conclusion.  Since the news of Yaeger’s initial success with the 
program was already well-traveled and well-received, Affiliated 
reached this minuscule goal in a month (Borowsky 367).  In fact, 
by the end of 1934, over one thousand theaters signed up for the 
Bank Night promotion at a cost of fifteen dollars per night for 
smaller locations and seventy five dollars for larger houses 
(367; Reynolds 212).   
 In exchange for the required royalties, Affiliated 
Enterprises provided each location with various materials to 
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promote and execute the Bank Night promotion.  These included 
movie trailers which introduced the event’s rules to their 
patrons, a register to house in the theater lobby for entry 
signatures, books to maintain records of participants and prize 
money, and a set of numbers to be used in the drawing itself 
(Reynolds 212).  The rules for Bank Night remained relatively 
unchanged from their original inception in 1933.  Theater 
managers were encouraged to keep the provided register in a 
central location where everyone, paying customer or not, could 
provide their name for consideration.  In order to insure that 
there was only one signature per person, managers and other 
staff members verified that each one was unique via a system of 
cross-indexing.  Each name was then assigned a number, which, in 
lieu of an actual name, would be announced as the winner on the 
night of each drawing.  Once completed, the lucky patron was 
allotted a reasonable amount of time, usually between five and 
ten minutes1, to arrive on-stage and claim their prize.  Since 
there was no charge and no ticket requirement to participate in 
Bank Night, the designated winner did not need to be in the 
auditorium or anywhere around the theater to participate.  
However, if they failed to meet the deadline, the prize money 
carried over to the next drawing (Kusell 190). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although the Bank Night instructions recommended a time limit of five to ten 




 Initially, the public response to Bank Night echoed the 
chaos that engulfed the Egyptian Theater.  Independent theater 
owners across America breathed a collective sigh of relief as 
Yaeger provided them with a lifeline, and a way to compete with 
the studio-owned houses.  As their member theaters profited, 
Affiliated Enterprises shared equal success as they collected 
royalties in excess of twenty-seven thousand dollars by the end 
of 1934 (Affiliated v. Commissioner 1940 393).  In an effort to 
capitalize on this financial momentum, Frank Ricketson helped 
his business partners organize twenty-six regional offices to 
help fulfill the increased demand (Parkhill 21).  By 1935, the 
company that began with only a handful of employees became a 
powerful entity in the motion picture industry. 
 As Affiliated Enterprises grew, entertainment reporters and 
film executives wondered if Yaeger would relocate his enterprise 
to either New York or Hollywood since these cities essentially 
comprised the movie business itself.  He immediately dismissed 
all rumors and requests regarding Affiliated’s departure from 
their home base in Denver.  “If we move to New York, I’ll be too 
far from the Rose Bowl football games,” Yaeger argued.  “If we 
go to Hollywood, I’ll be too far from the World Series, and I 
haven’t missed a series in years.  Besides, I can’t find a city 
as close to such swell trout fishing as Denver.  We’re doing 
okay here” (Parkhill 82).  Although he elected to keep his 
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distance from the movie studios in New York and California, 
industry executives monitored Yaeger’s activities through 
various channels.  While they recognized his success, the major 
studios did not approve of the Bank Night promotion because its 
member theaters were spending money on it rather than 
advertising and promoting the latest Hollywood feature (Borowsky 
370).     
 Despite this objection, Bank Night finally presented 
independent theaters with a way to battle their competition and 
keep their doors open week after week.  The promotion delivered 
on its promise to be “an antidote” for the declining box office 
revenues, and theater owners heralded it as a grand success.  
However, as cinemas reaped their rewards, their respective 
communities experienced a different transformation.  According 
to the Saturday Evening Post, the towns that hosted a Bank Night 
drawing were all but shut down on the evening of the theater’s 
event:   
It’s got to the point where nobody can schedule a 
basketball game, a church sociable or a contract party on 
Tuesday night, because everyone is down at The Gem hoping 
to cop a cash prize – usually standing in the street beyond 




The Motion Picture Herald, a well-respected industry journal at 
the time, confirmed the chaos surrounding Bank Night with a 
less-than-complementary review.  They labeled Yaeger’s creation 
as a “veritable Frankenstein” controlled by several dozen police 
officers who reroute traffic around the theater in order to 
accommodate the large crowds that wait outside (Reynolds 213).   
 Although millions of Americans participated in the weekly 
Bank Night drawings, some city leaders and local business owners 
viewed the promotion as a menace (Reynolds 216).  Still, Yaeger 
and Affiliated Enterprises continued to enlist thousands of 
locations as active customers.  By mid-1936, A.G. Edwards, 
Affiliated’s promotion and publicity manager, estimated that 
over four thousand theaters had implemented Bank Night at their 
locations (“In Excess” 12).  In fact, the practice was such a 
financial success for independent theaters that the larger, 
studio-owned palaces eventually adopted it.  Loew’s Theaters, 
RKO, Fox, and Warner Bros. all signed up with Affiliated 
Enterprises for their share of the box-office business (Borowsky 
368).  By the end of 1936, weekly theater attendance had nearly 
doubled its 1933 estimates.  Over eighty-one million Americans 
visited their local movie theater that year, and revenues were 
up a quarter of a million dollars from 1935 figures (“Cinema: 
Bank Night Bans”).  There is little doubt that Bank Night was a 
major factor in this industry revival. 
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 As their monthly royalties continued to skyrocket, 
Affiliated Enterprises, the small Colorado company which started 
with a simple idea, grew with them.  Charles Yaeger hired 
several more staff members to help sort through the incoming 
checks and distribute the necessary promotional wares.  The Bank 
Night group even started a special monthly newsletter that 
offered advice and successful strategies to their member 
locations (Affiliated v. Commissioner 1940 393).  By mid-decade, 
over sixty percent of the theaters still in operation used some 
type of giveaway each week, whether it was Affiliated’s gem or 
otherwise (Kusell 191).  John Mannheim, representative for the 
Independent Theater Owners Association, noted that close to 
ninety percent of the houses that belonged to his organization 
relied on giveaways to sustain their operations (Crisler 5).  
The theaters that opted out of Yaeger’s game chose instead to 
raffle various prizes, but Bank Night remained the most 
successful and the most profitable for all involved (Borowsky 
368).   
 Both Charles Yaeger and Frank Ricketson were extremely 
proud of their creation and the safety net it provided to 
thousands of theater owners who would have otherwise drowned.  
In his book on how to properly manage a movie theater, Ricketson 
proclaimed Bank Night’s promotional supremacy and offered his 
expert opinion on why it was necessary: 
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A few years ago the giveaway was not considered show 
business.  And even now, it is a racket that every 
exhibitor dislikes to employ.  The depression and poor 
pictures have made it a necessary adjunct in certain types 
of theaters.  Whether an improvement in pictures will 
eliminate this type of box office stimulation is a matter 
that the future will have to decide.  My hunch is the 
giveaway racket is here to stay, or at least until ended by 
legislation. (249-250) 
Unfortunately for Ricketson, Yaeger, and Affiliated Enterprise 
in general, the latter half of this proclamation was more 
prophetic than perhaps initially realized.  For as Bank Night 
grew, so too did the complaints against it.   
 Some theater managers, who were ill-equipped to deal with 
the large crowds, argued that they could no longer properly 
accommodate those patrons who actually wanted to see the movie 
instead of solely participate in the night’s drawing (Washburn 
165).  “It makes the fan angry,” stated one independent 
exhibitor who worried that his theater was more of a gambling 
hall rather than a reputable cinema (165).  “A squawk is bound 
to follow, possibly a shooting, and cries of fraud, all enough 
to drive [us] managers crazy” (165).  Again, this claim eerily 
signaled events to come.  In Minneapolis, the Bank Night chaos 
not only engulfed the town’s movie patrons but the theater 
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owners themselves.  The so-called “Chance Games War” began after 
a theater, owned by local businessman Harry Dickerman, was 
destroyed by a bomb.  Although no official charges were leveled, 
other exhibitors were suspected of the crime because they were 
not happy with Dickerman’s “unethical” giveways which 
continually escalated competition in the city.  Before the 
unfortunate event, Mr. Dickerman apparently agreed to 
discontinue the promotional practices at his theater.  But, he 
failed to honor this agreement (Fuller-Seeley, “Dish” 265). 
 In Kansas City, Mrs. Abe Baier, who owned the Lindbergh 
Theater, argued that Bank Night and all similar promotional 
gimmicks were nothing more than a nuisance.  In fact, she was 
among the first theater owners to claim that Yaeger’s game was 
against the law.  In a heartfelt letter to the United States 
Postmaster General, Mrs. Baier contended that Bank Night was a 
growing national concern and, if left unchecked, would “lead to 
a most disastrous condition for [her] theater and a few others 
which do not wish to cheapen their operation by running 
lotteries…” (Fuller-Seeley, “Dish” 265).  Baier added the fact 
that more theaters subscribe to Bank Night every month, and it 
would not be long until everyone was forced to rely on it (265).  
In fact, the promotion became so popular with theater owners 
that it was difficult to determine why some patrons visited 
their local movie house in the first place.  In his article for 
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The New York Times, Thomas Pryor echoed Baier’s concerns about 
Bank Night in regards to the audience at large.  Since roughly 
half of all operating theaters participated in the scheme, Pryor 
questioned “if people really expect to be entertained by 
Hollywood’s glamour children when they go to the movies or do 
they go with the idea of amusing themselves…” (150).    
 The notion that moviegoers attended the theater each week 
for a chance to win a quick cash prize instead of a true desire 
to see the on-screen feature became a primary concern for some 
film industry executives.  In fact, Gradwell Sears, head of 
Warner’s sales department, proclaimed that he would not book his 
studio’s films in any theater that presented weekly games or 
promotions of any kind.  Sears believed that Warner’s features 
should be the key attraction for patrons, and theater managers 
would need to concentrate their marketing efforts solely on the 
movie and its “merits as an entertainment” (Pryor 150).  David 
Loew, executive for Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and its theater chain, 
also voiced his concern that Bank Night was stealing the 
spotlight away from the feature presentation.  After he noticed 
that the smaller, independently-owned houses drew larger crowds 
with the promotion, Loew decided to implement Yaeger’s game at 
his locations.  However, after just three months, the studio 
executive decided to halt the practice and “[go] back to the 
picture business” (Reynolds 218). 
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 Despite the critical opinions and negative publicity, Bank 
Night’s parent company and its founders continually reaped the 
rewards of their creation.  Yaeger and Ricketson welcomed the 
arrival of weekly royalty checks from various theater owners 
across America who paid as much as seventy-five dollars for each 
event.  According to Internal Revenue Service records, 
Affiliated collected $348,323 in licensing fees by the end of 
1935 and, after deducting operating expenses and payroll, 
cleared $159,173 (Affiliated v. Commissioner 1940 394).  By 
1936, these figures more than doubled (394).  While Ricketson 
celebrated such a grand return on his investment, Yaeger spent 
his fortune almost as fast as he received it.  He started a 
small theater chain of his own, established a movie trailer 
production studio, purchased printing facilities, and invested 
in real estate (Parkhill 20).     
 While Yaeger enjoyed his newly acquired wealth, 
Affiliated’s legal team, which consisted of forty-one different 
attorneys in thirty cities, constantly defended the Bank Night 
name against infringement by theater owners who presented some 
variation of the promotion under a different title.  According 
to Emmett Thurston, the head legal representative for the 
company, lawyers argued over seven hundred copyright suits at 
one time (Borowsky 370).  In order to escape royalty fees, some 
theater operators presented the promotion under a different name 
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such as “Prosperity Night” or “Cash Night” (Affiliated v. 
Commissioner 1940 391).  However, since the concept remained 
intact, Thurston and his team claimed that these locations 
infringed upon Affiliated’s trademark as originally submitted in 
1933.  However, since Yaeger never received a government patent 
for his creation, and since he only filed for copyright on a 
state-by-state basis, some theater owners seized the opportunity 
to challenge the company’s position regarding naming rights. 
 In late 1936, Affiliated Enterprises sued two such theater 
owners, one in Oklahoma and the other in Massachusetts, for 
presenting a variation of the Bank Night game without paying the 
required royalties to the creator.  While the Colorado-based 
company believed these would be an open and shut case of 
trademark infringement, they actually placed a legal spotlight 






Bank Night Goes To Court 
 
In his Saturday Evening Post article, writer Forbes Parkill 
argued that, “it [was] almost inconceivable that anyone in the 
United States doesn’t know how Bank Night works” (21).  While it 
is true that, by mid-decade, the American public at large knew 
about and understood how the game worked, state judicial systems 
had yet to conduct their own inquiries about the promotion.  
However, as Affiliated Enterprises sought judgments against 
theater owners who failed to pay their weekly dues, the courts 
examined the finer details of Yaeger’s scheme and questioned its 
legality.  First, there was an issue regarding naming rights.  
Did Affiliated truly own the name Bank Night even though the 
company never received a patent?  As mentioned earlier, the 
Colorado-based company applied for a trademark on a state-by-
state basis.  However, as the case of Affiliated Enterprises vs. 
Gantz demonstrates, Yaeger and company did not fully examine the 
limitations on such transactions.  
In December 1936, Affiliated sued the owner of a small 
theater in Sand Springs, Oklahoma after he presented Bank Night 
to his patrons without officially subscribing to the plan.  
Emmett Thurman, who represented the Bank Night company, argued 
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that the rightful owners of the promotion filed paperwork with 
the Secretary of State for Oklahoma which he believed mandated a 
legal trademark.  Therefore, the accused was liable “for damages 
and profits realized from its use” (Affiliated v. Gantz 598).  
Three judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the 
lawsuit along with the intricacies of Oklahoma trademark law.  
The Court found that Affiliated’s claim to sole ownership of the 
name Bank Night in the state of Oklahoma was invalid.  According 
to statutes of 1931, trademark by name alone, which is what 
Yaeger originally intended, could only be obtained by 
manufacturers of specific goods, advertisements to help promote 
unions or other groups, and dairy products.  Under these terms, 
the Bank Night promotion did not qualify for the trademark, and 
therefore the Sand Springs theater was not required to pay any 
royalties for its use (Affiliated v. Gantz 599).  In addition to 
this verdict, the judges also questioned the nature of the Bank 
Night promotion itself.  Over the course of the proceedings, the 
terms of the game were discussed in full including the fact that 
no paid admission was required to participate.  In his 
concluding remarks, Circuit Judge Lewis stated, “this seems to 
be a subterfuge to escape the stigma of being a lottery” 
(Affiliated v. Gantz 399).  While the Oklahoma case was not 
tried on these charges, the statement echoed the lawsuits to 
come across America.      
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Although the case only had ramifications in Oklahoma, 
another similar suit in Massachusetts definitively changed 
Affiliated’s business plan for good.  As before, Yaeger and 
company sought damages from a theater using the Bank Night 
method under the name “Parlay Cash Night” (Affiliated v. Gruber 
960).  And, as in the Oklahoma case, the judge declared that the 
theater owner did not violate any trademark by using a different 
name.  “One cannot adopt a descriptive name as a trademark and 
thus bar others from using all names tending to describe the 
same article,” stated First Circuit Judge Bingham in his opinion 
of the case (960).  Bingham declared that such a copyright would 
essentially grant Affiliated Enterprises with a monopoly over 
Bank Night or any variation of that name.  “If literary property 
could be protected under the theory that the name by which it is 
christened is equivalent to a trademark,” Bingham added, “there 
would be no necessity for copyright laws” (961).   
In effect, without this ruling, Yaeger and his team could 
continue to sue any theater owner if they attempted a similar 
promotion.  However, there was one final statement which assured 
that these trademark suits would come to an end.  Judge Bingham 
noted that Affiliated never received a patent for their idea, 
and it was therefore available to everyone without threat of 
infringement.  He states: 
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However good and valuable an idea, plan, scheme, or system 
is, the moment it is disclosed to the public without the 
protection of a patent, it becomes public property, and the 
fact that it has been made popular by advertising and the 
expenditure of effort, time, and money on the part of the 
originator does not alter the situation. (961) 
Once this ruling was announced through newspapers and trade 
journals, theater managers across America understood that they 
no longer needed to pay Affiliated in order to use Bank Night 
(Affiliated v. Commissioner 1940 400). 
 The Gantz and Gruber cases forever altered the business 
practices of Affiliated Enterprises.  The company could no 
longer rely on thousands of dollars each week from their member 
theaters.  If they were to survive this blow, they needed a new 
direction.  So, in early 1937, Yaeger and his team changed their 
name from Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. to Bank Night Theater 
Service.  Since they still maintained a proper copyright over 
trailers and other material produced to market the promotion, 
the new service focused solely on these products and created a 
monthly publication to help theater managers and owners maximize 
the Bank Night experience (Affiliated v. Commissioner 1944 650).  
Even though they managed to restructure their business after the 
rulings, Yaeger’s profits were reduced to more than half (650).  
At this point, the Bank Night Theater Service could not 
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withstand any further accusations or detrimental legal 
decisions.  Unfortunately for the company, one such accusation, 
which was originally addressed and debated upon in a May 1935 
case, started to gain some momentum in various courts across 
America.  Was Bank Night a lottery? 
 Because the Great Depression financially devastated many 
families, all forty-eight states enacted laws that specifically 
prohibited lotteries “in an effort to prevent the squandering 
and wasting of savings…” (“Consideration” 402).  At this time, 
the United States defined a lottery in accordance with a 
description in Webster’s Dictionary:  “a scheme for the 
distribution of prizes by lot or chance, especially a scheme by 
which one or more prizes are distributed by chance among persons 
who have paid or promised a consideration for a chance to win 
them…” (State 951).  Therefore, in order for Bank Night to be 
defined as a lottery and illegal under U. S. law, one must prove 
that a prize, a chance, and consideration are all present.  
 Both a cash prize and the chance to win said prize were 
unquestionably a part of Yaeger’s promotion.  However, it was 
rather difficult to determine if consideration, or the fact that 
something of value was exchanged in order to participate in the 
game, was present.  In fact, when Bank Night was initially 
created, both Yaeger and Ricketson believed that their scheme 
would escape such charges since all participants played for 
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free.  But, as the game grew more popular and crowds became 
increasingly more difficult to control, it was only a matter of 
time until someone somewhere declared it to be against the law.  
In late 1935, such accusations were levied against Mr. James 
Wall, the owner of a small theater in Medford, Massachusetts, 
after local police determined his Bank Night promotion was 
nothing more than a ruse to increase theater profits.  The 
ensuing court case, known as Commonwealth v. Wall, would not 
only be one of the first legal declarations of Yaeger’s scheme 
as a lottery, other judges and attorneys across America would 
use it to demonstrate precedent. 
 Before local authorities investigated Wall’s weekly game, 
they had received numerous complaints from concerned citizens 
who argued that, since the winner had only two minutes to claim 
their prize, the only possible way to win was to purchase a 
ticket and be inside the auditorium.  If such a charge were 
true, it would confirm the presence of consideration and 
therefore meet all the requirements of a lottery.  So, on 
December 11 and December 18 of 1935, undercover police officers 
purchased tickets to Wall’s theater and observed how the owner 
conducted his Bank Night drawings.  According to Yaeger’s 
original rules for the promotion, the time allotted for the 
winner to claim their prize was at the discretion of each 
theater manager.  In Wall’s case, he advertised that “the winner 
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must appear ‘within a reasonable time’” instead of any precise 
minute amount (Commonwealth).  Therefore, it was inevitably up 
to him to determine what constituted a “reasonable” time, and he 
could end the drawing with little to no advance warning.  In 
fact, during the December 18 performance, officers noticed that 
dozens of unlucky patrons stood up after the drawing and made 
their way to the exits.  However, before the group walked the 
full length of the aisle, Wall dimmed the lights and began the 
night’s feature.  In short, they discovered the public’s 
accusations to be correct.  In order to win, a person must be 
inside the theater in order to beat the mere seconds allotted to 
claim the cash (Commonwealth). 
 Week after week, hundreds of moviegoers filled Wall’s 
theater and the sidewalk outside of it.  And, week after week, 
the cash prize remained unclaimed.  The owner continued to reap 
record profits while the customers that provided it left empty-
handed.2  However, by May 1936, Wall’s shrewd business tactics 
warranted the undivided attention of justices on the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court.  After local authorities completed 
their investigation and determined that the theater was 
operating an illegal lottery under the guise of Bank Night, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Although no similar charges were leveled against the Coleman Theater in 
Miami, Oklahoma, recent photographs of actual Bank Night winner announcements 
confirm that some locations did not award a cash prize each week.  In regards 
to the Coleman, a total of 19 people (out of the 100 drawn) collected their 
winnings for the entire year of 1936.  
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Court agreed with their assertions and determined that Yaeger’s 
promotion was against state law.  Although Wall’s attorney 
argued that patrons could enter the weekly sweepstakes without 
cost, the justices stated that “…a game does not cease to be a 
lottery because some, or even many, of the players are admitted 
for free, so long as others continued to pay for their chance” 
(Commonwealth). 
 Furthermore, the Court took note of the short time frame 
that Wall prescribed for winners to appear on-stage.  In his 
final written opinion on the case, Justice Qua wrote: 
An important feature of the plan was the necessity that the 
person whose number was drawn should appear at once and 
claim the deposit.  The time allotted for appearance was 
entirely within the control of the defendant.  No definite 
time seems to have been fixed.  A participant inside the 
theater would have the advantage of immediate presence in 
place of comfort. (Commonwealth)               
While it was admirable that patrons could enter a Bank Night 
drawing without any initial cost, Qua concluded that “the object 
of the defendant was to fill the theater, not the lobby or the 
sidewalk” (Commonwealth).   
 Although the Court essentially defined Bank Night as a 
lottery, they stopped short of banning the practice outright in 
Massachusetts.  The Commonwealth v. Wall case was specifically 
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aimed at a sole defendant and the unfair manner in which he 
conducted his weekly drawings.  Regardless of any statewide 
declaration, however, the case and its ruling provided an 
essential reference point for other attorneys who wished to rid 
their communities of what had quickly become a problem in their 
respective towns.  In June 1936, their crusade to expel Bank 
Night gained further momentum after a report by the Federal 
Council of Churches of Christ in America labeled the promotion 
as an “incitement to gambling” (“Further”).  And, as similar 
complaints continued to mount in various communities across 
America, the United States Post Office decided that, since the 
promotion is under such scrutiny, “any publications or 
advertisements pertaining to Bank Night drawings were deemed 
‘unmailable under Section 6013 of the Postal Laws and 
Regulations’” (“Bank Night – Moviegoers’ Mirage”).  In effect, 
this meant that theaters could no longer advertise their 
drawings in any newspaper, magazine, or other publication 
subject to distribution via mail.   
 Despite the controversies and the looming charges against 
them, thousands of theaters continued with business as usual.  
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Bank Night drawings continued each week and no doubt contributed 
to the increased attendance figures for the year 1936 (“Film 
Book”).  In fact, according to the Film Daily Year Book, the 
number of operating theaters in the United States increased by 
more than seven hundred since their 1934 estimates (“Film 
Book”).  As Tino Balio concludes in his widely recognized 
synopsis of the period, Bank Night and other similar promotions 
“kept more theaters open during the Depression than any other 
device” (28).  “[It] was,” as Forbes Parkhill describes in his 
Saturday Evening Post article, “an oxygen tent for the gasping 
motion picture exhibitors, who, during Depression depths, had 
been disastrously dunked in a sea of red ink” (20).  However, 
there were still those who wished to suffocate Bank Night’s 










Defining A Lottery 
 
 Although Yaeger’s promotion was initially received by 
independently owned theaters in small town markets, Bank Night 
was also a grand success in larger cities like Chicago.  In 
fact, by the end of 1936, only fifty of the three hundred 
theaters in the Illinois metropolis did not present the weekly 
cash giveaway to their customers (“Chicago Police”).  And, since 
some movie houses adopted the practice earlier than others, a 
December 1936 Christian Science Monitor article estimated that 
nearly six million dollars had been awarded to various customers 
over a two-year period with some individual prizes as high as 
$2,750 (“Theater”).  While these amounts no doubt attracted the 
attention of Chicago’s cash strapped citizens, they also 
troubled groups like the Better Business Bureau (BBB) who, in 
November 1936, issued a warning that the promotion was against a 
“sound business practice” (“Chicago To Enforce”).  
 Although theater managers respected the BBB’s status and 
authority, they were reluctant to make any changes to their 
weekly operations.  However, by December, the fight against 
Chicago’s Bank Night dilemma found a new champion in Police 
Commissioner James P. Allman, who yielded more legal power than 
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the business organization and was definitely capable of halting 
the giveaway permanently.  Allman studied the BBB’s complaints 
and was aware of certain court cases, like Commonwealth v. Wall, 
that defined Bank Night as a lottery.  However, Chicago courts 
remained undecided on the issue, and theater managers were free 
to present the promotion without any threat of prosecution.  
That is, until Allman decided enough was enough (“Theater”). 
 On December 26, 1936, acting on complaints and information 
from Mayor Edward J. Kelly’s so-called “Corporation Council,” 
headed by Mr. Barnett Hodes, Police Commissioner Allman ordered 
all theaters to stop Bank Nights or any similar promotion 
effective immediately (“Theater”).  Both Hodes and Allman agreed 
that, since the drawings equated to a “chance distribution of 
money,” they were against section 1901 of Chicago’s city code 
(“Fight”).  Still, even after the commissioner issued his edict, 
many theater managers still remained unmoved.  In fact, the two 
hundred and fifty locations had a combined total of $100,000 to 
giveaway during the busy holiday week (“Fight”).  Furthermore, 
Affiliated Enterprises advised their client theaters that Bank 
Night remained a legal practice and contained “no elements of 
lottery” (“Chicago Police”).  Allman disagreed with Affiliated’s 
assertions and threatened to arrest any and all managers who 
continued the promotion (“Chicago Police”). 
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 On December 27, one day after he issued his order, the 
police commissioner dispatched officers to arrest sixteen 
theater managers who continued their drawings despite any 
warning (“Fight”).  It was painfully clear that Allman’s crusade 
to rid Chicago of Yaeger’s creation was indeed very serious.  
Soon after these first arrests, both the Balaban & Katz theater 
chain, which maintained a strong presence in the city, and the 
Warner Brothers theater chain volunteered to end Bank Night at 
their locations (“Chicago To Enforce”).  If more communities 
across America followed Chicago’s lead, it would certainly lead 
to more problems for these nationally recognized companies.   
 Despite their gesture of goodwill, sixteen managers were 
jailed for violating city code.  Although they were only held 
for a few hours and each posted bail of $100, the theater 
employees remained adamant that their promotions were completely 
legal and petitioned the city to stop any further arrests 
(“Fight”).  While those against the giveaways found a friend in 
Police Commissioner Allman, the managers relied on Alderman 
Walter J. Orlikoski to defend their cause.  Orlikoski did not 
view Bank Night as harmful.  In fact, he believed that the game 
actually helped some of Chicago’s poverty stricken citizens with 
a free chance to win a large cash prize (“Chicago To Enforce”).  
After the arrests, the alderman encouraged his fellow city 
council members to repeal section 1901, which would end the 
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conviction of theater managers and allow the Bank Night drawings 
to continue.  Shortly after Orlikoski’s announcement, Mayor 
Kelly argued that he was never in favor of Police Commissioner 
Allman’s actions and ordered him to issue summons instead of 
taking individuals into custody (“To End”). 
 While the mayor’s proclamation was hailed by theater 
operators as a victory, it was simply too little, too late.  By 
the first of January 1937, Illinois Attorney General Otto Kerner 
“declared the giving away of premiums or prizes was in effect a 
lottery and violated state law” (“Chicago To Enforce”).  Armed 
with Kerner’s new declaration, the Chicago BBB and other civic 
groups petitioned Superior Court Judge C. Neimeyer to ban Bank 
Night inside the city limits (“Movie”).  By February, Neimeyer 
ruled that Bank Night and other similar prize drawings were 
illegal (“Movie”).  News of this decision spread beyond the city 
itself and provided powerful evidence for other individuals and 
groups across America who felt the weekly cash giveaways were 
immoral and unethical. 
Perhaps one of the most vocal opponents to Bank Night on a 
national level was New York City License Commissioner Paul Moss, 
who exclaimed that “cheap ballyhoo” was a constant distraction 
for most moviegoers and a stain on the motion picture industry 
in general (“Bank Nights’ Assailed”).  “Instead of sound [and] 
constructive showmanship,” Moss stated in an editorial for 
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Boxoffice Magazine, “the owners and managers of the industry are 
utilizing the dangerous practices commonly found in fly-by-night 
state fairs and circuses” (4).  The commissioner believed that 
the drawings detracted from the moviegoing experience itself and 
cheapened the production values of any Hollywood feature (4).   
Moss viewed Bank Night and other like promotions no 
different than any dangerous disease that, when left unchecked, 
would lead to a “chaotic condition”: 
It is a natural conclusion that if a theater starts a 
certain method of increasing their patronage, that his 
competitor will try to outdo him, and where the first 
theater would give away a plate, the second would give away 
two, and so on, until finally theatres became merchandise 
distributors rather than places of entertainment. (4)            
He concluded his damning remarks with his opinion regarding the 
legality of such operations.  Moss warned that theater managers 
and employees should not be surprised if they “wake up some 
morning” to protests by local civic groups and threats of 
prosecution because their promotions were too close to gambling 
(Moss 16). 
 One week after Boxoffice published Moss’s rant, they 
extended the same courtesy to Milton C. Weisman, counsel for the 
Independent Theater Owners’ Association, for his rebuttal.  
Weisman emphatically denied the commissioner’s charge that Bank 
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Night was essentially a lottery.  “Since the price of admission 
is not raised on nights the game is played,” he stated, “the 
patron parts with nothing additional for the privilege of 
winning a prize.  When it is unnecessary even to purchase a 
ticket of admission to win a prize, obviously no consideration 
is paid” (12).  Furthermore, Weisman took issue with Moss’s 
claim that the promotion somehow degraded the evening’s 
entertainment:   
Due to the shortage of adequate product, being forced to 
play what is available long after the product has been 
shown at the local circuit theatre (with not much 
difference in price), independent exhibitors have been 
forced to either find some means of attracting patronage or 
closing their theaters ‘during alterations.’  They have 
found these games to be the answer to the problem. (12)   
In his concluding remarks, Weisman accused “the forces of law 
and order” of using Bank Night prosecutions as a way to win 
favor with local voters (12). 
 While Moss and Weisman volleyed in the pages of a motion 
picture industry trade magazine, Yaeger’s scheme garnered 
further national attention.  By June 1937, courts in Texas, 
Connecticut, and New York labeled Bank Night as a lottery and 
therefore illegal in their respective states (Reynolds 218; 
“Outlaws”).  Some theater owners in Indiana actually welcomed 
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such regulation in their state because they wanted to dispose of 
the cheap gimmicks in favor of good entertainment (Reynolds 
218).  Their sentiment echoed Milton Weisman’s belief that Bank 
Night and other similar games “[would] stop when the industry 
comes to a realization, as it certainly must, of the necessity 
of giving the independent exhibitor a better ‘run’ for his 
money” (12).  In reality, however, these theaters needed 
Yaeger’s promotion in order to survive the turbulent decade.  
Once America started to recover from the Great Depression, and 
once theater owners stabilized their profits, it was apparent 
that Bank Night was no longer a necessity.   
 By early 1938, Bank Night was all but extinct.  In January, 
Oregon outlawed the promotion and Vermont followed two months 
later (“‘Bank Nights’ Dropped”; “Change”).  As in the 
Commonwealth v. Wall case, defendants in the Vermont trial 
argued that Bank Night could not be a lottery because no 
consideration was present since patrons were allowed to 
participate without cost.  However, the Vermont Supreme Court 
adopted the position that “‘the fact that a ticket of admission 
is not required is not sufficient to save the scheme known as 
Bank Night…from being a lottery’” (“Change”).  While states like 
Kentucky, Rhode Island, Florida, and New Jersey would eventually 
follow suit and ban Yaeger’s promotion completely, these court 
decisions did not deliver the final knockout blow to Affiliated 
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Enterprises.  Instead, that unfortunate honor was awarded to a 
much larger opponent. 
Since the latter half of 1936, the United States Post 
Office grew increasingly familiar with Affiliated’s operations 
and the Bank Night scheme they promoted.  In fact, postal 
workers from across America attended weekly drawings and 
complained that they, or no one else present for that matter, 
ever won the prize (“Mails”).  Initially, any advertisement or 
mention of Yaeger’s promotion was barred from the mail service.  
However, after postal inspectors investigated the Denver-based 
company further, they determined that Affiliated grossed more 
$1,250,000 over a two-year period (“Mails”).  While Yaeger’s 
attorneys claimed that ninety percent of their income covered 
their operating costs and was not technically profit, the 
Postmaster’s department noted that the cash was from theater 
managers and owners who wanted to purchase a Bank Night license 
(“‘Bank Nights’ Barred”).  In effect, that license contributed 
to the construction of an illegal lottery. 
Attorney Peter John Connolly, who represented the office of 
Postmaster General James Farley, determined that “compulsory 
registration of participants was a technical ‘consideration’ and 
therefore Bank Nights were lotteries” (“‘Bank Nights’ Barred”).  
Based on this opinion, Farley ordered both incoming and outgoing 
mail service to Affiliated Enterprises closed effective April 
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15, 1938.  The stoppage would keep any further licenses or other 
promotional material from being purchased or distributed and 
therefore end Yaeger’s business completely (“Mails”).  The plan 
worked.  Since they could no longer communicate effectively with 
their member theaters or collect any further income, Affiliated 
Enterprises closed (Affiliated v. Commissioner 1940 395).  
Although some theaters still presented Bank Night to their 
customers, managers could no longer rely on any information from 
the man who started it. 
Over the next few months, Yaeger’s game, either through 
legislation or choice, slowly exited the American landscape.  
While it may appear like an unfortunate conclusion, Bank Night 
had all but served its purpose.  The game helped thousands of 
theaters and theater owners keep their doors open to the public, 
and it allowed thousands upon thousands of movie patrons a 
chance to remedy their financial woes.  As for the promotion’s 
creators, Frank Ricketson remained in the film industry as an 
executive for Fox Intermountain Theaters.  And, aside from 
managing his many other business ventures, Charles Yaeger 
remained out of the public eye and never missed an opportunity 
to attend a World Series game (“Charlie”).              







                
 
 The story of Bank Night serves as a prime example of why 
exhibition studies is such an important and necessary element of 
any film discipline.  While motion pictures themselves have long 
been and will continue to be the focus of film scholarship, a 
full case study of any individual film must include a 
description of how this film was presented to the public and 
should examine how factors of exhibition and promotion aided in 
either the success or failure of the movie itself.  For example, 
anyone who chooses to examine any feature during the era of Bank 
Night would be remiss in excluding Yaeger’s promotion from their 
discussion.  It provides a clear reason why box office receipts 
increased during a time of such financial hardship.  
Furthermore, with this new information, some scholars may 
question if moviegoers attended the theater because of a true 
interest in the film or because they wanted to win some money.  
This is but one example of how exhibition studies can help 
provide a complete history of motion pictures. 
 Of course, it is important to extend some concession.  In 
years past, it would have been incredibly difficult to include 
many of the facts and figures necessary to piece together a 
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study of film exhibition.  Many of these records were not 
readily available, and those who endeavored to find such 
documents either needed to visit a distant archive or sift 
through rolls of microfilm.  Today, it is relatively easy to 
obtain digital versions of studio records, trade magazines, 
court documents, newspaper articles and more through various 
online databases.  While the Internet provides some new key 
information, however, there is still no replacement for the 
library itself and the valuable information within.  This may 
explain why few film students select exhibition studies as their 
focus.  It does require an extreme amount of time and attention 
to complete, but the scholarship is worth any investment.   
 I believe this thesis delivers an unprecedented description 
of the Bank Night promotion and its effect on film exhibition 
during the 1930s.  While other film scholars have addressed 
Yaeger’s game in their own works, their stories conclude after 
only a few paragraphs and do not fully explain the impact it had 
on the motion picture industry.  I hope that this thesis not 
only provides more information for future scholars to digest but 
also inspires them to expand on this and other topics even 
further.  There is still much more to be said and much more work 
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